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From early romanticism to more recent post-structuralist and post-
colonial studies, all the possibilities and impossibilities that are 
inherent in translation have fueled debate about authorship, intent, 
readership, functional equivalence, worldview, the building of 
national literatures, power differentials, ethics, and gender issues—
among many other topics—and, of course, about the nature of 
“meaning” as the alleged sole legal tender of “all things translation.” 
However, translation has less often been scrutinized as a form of 
rhetorical transaction; fundamentally, all translations are attempts, 
in and of themselves, to persuade their readership of some degree 
of correspondence with their source. They have also been seen as 
covertly phatic texts; they call the audience’s attention to the 
existence of another text that translation identifies, mimics, 
annihilates, and resurrects. Translations advertise the existence of a 
text by, paradoxically, causing it to “disappear” in its original form 
and then by taking over its identity; a translation is the very illusion 
of reading Dostoyevsky or Borges while actually not doing so. 
However, the relationship between translation and rhetoric 
surpasses this ontological threshold of persuasion, by which readers 
of translations are prone to be persuaded of clean equivalence 
between texts.  
In this paper I demonstrate how systematic inclusion of 
rhetoric-centered approaches in translation studies, and vice versa, 
would not only cross-fertilize these two fields, but would also help 
shed light on some areas where a monolingual focus has all too 
often imposed significant limitations on progress. First, I will 
suggest an ad hoc selection of classical and modern approaches to 
rhetoric and will reflect on their correspondence (or lack of it) with 
the scant focus that translation studies has placed on rhetoric. In 
the second section, I will provide a quick overview of what I define 
as a “rhetoric of meaning in translation studies.” There I will 
discuss how some of the core notions in translation theory are 
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significantly mediated by assumptions about meaning and language 
that cannot escape a degree of servitude to specific epistemological 
rhetoric(s). These tend either to underestimate or overgeneralize 
the effect of rhetoric within texts being translated.  
In the third section of this paper, I will explore potential 
disciplinary concurrences through the field of comparative rhetoric 
in order to establish a basis for the translation of rhetorical devices 
that is not constricted solely by source language-dictated features. 
Finally, the discussion will turn in the fourth and last section to 
comparing how the study of rhetorical correspondence at the micro 
level in source and target languages and texts may be substantially 
hindered by significant structural disparities at the macro level that 
may not have been systematically or successfully incorporated into 
the wider theoretical framework of translation studies. I will 
provide specific examples and analyses illustrating these disparities 
in order to suggest potential avenues for further research 
incorporating rhetoric-centered approaches to translation studies. 
 
Ad Hoc Definitions of Rhetoric for Translation 
Purposes 
In this section, I will summarily explore a number of theoretical 
stances in the field of rhetoric that would seem to impinge on 
translation and translation theory. An apology is due in the first 
place to scholars and experts in the field of rhetoric for the 
necessarily fragmentary nature of this section. In an attempt to 
provide an overview of a series of notions from a field that has been 
visited only occasionally and with more or less success by 
translation studies in the last few decades, the following wide-
ranging review of concepts and schools of thought is bound to be 
perceived as hasty and sketchy. Well-versed scholars might 
rightfully claim an indiscriminate mix of areas, and perhaps even of 
reciprocally excluding theoretical paradigms. 
Captatio benevolentiae aside, discourse in translation theory 
has indeed been permeated throughout the centuries by a 
defensive, apologetic tenor even in some of the classical texts in the 
discipline, such as Hieronymus’s and Martin Luther’s defenses of 
their translational strategies in their renditions of the Bible. In 
more recent times, it is not uncommon for seminal texts in the 
discipline to start out as overtly apologetic infringements into the 
territory of other fields or aggressive intrusions from other 
disciplines. Translation studies is an intrinsically interdisciplinary 
and sometimes also multidisciplinary field. It is inherently inclined 
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to embark on excursions beyond its perceived boundaries and to 
carry about incursions into remote fields. Like translation itself, 
translation studies tend not to be the center of things, but more 
often to be between things: between cultures, between languages, 
between peoples, between disciplines and intellectual paradigms—
always between, never the center. The “in-between” is thus a 
frequent metaphorical denomination for the members of the 
translation and interpreting community that could very well apply 
to their disciplinary counterparts in academia (Pym, 2012, 13-35).  
As a relatively new field of scholarship, translation and 
interpreting studies has an intrinsic need to draw from well-
established fields, linguistics, cultural studies, psycholinguistics, 
anthropology, pragmatics, literary studies, second language 
acquisition, comparative grammar, terminology, lexicography, and 
philosophy among others. This seems connatural to the field’s 
ability to develop and grow as an academic discipline and area of 
inquiry beyond the plane of professional education (commonly and 
misleadingly known as “translator and interpreter training”). The 
only possible regret in such radical interdisciplinarity may be the 
inexplicable neglect of visiting other, perhaps closer, familiar and 
compatible grounds. Rhetoric and translation studies have 
regrettably been one of those “reciprocally ignorant neighbors.” 
During nearly perfect decade-based progressions, and almost in 
Kuhnian terms, epistemological paradigms in translation studies 
have been explored, never completely exploited, and often rendered 
passé by subsequent “incommensurable” and sometimes self-
excluding disciplinary turns (Pym, 2010). Within that relentless 
forward movement, however, as the next section will show, efforts 
in translation studies and translation theory have swung—
pendulously or decidedly—between micro-textual frontal-assault 
tactics and macro-textual overarching envelopments in a way that 
is reminiscent of the “big rhetoric” vs. “little rhetoric” debate, by 
which rhetoric as a discipline debated whether it should be entitled 
to push the envelope of its traditional limits and make inroads into 
the epistemic questioning of other disciplines (Ingraham, 2015, 8). 
In a similar way, epistemological shifts in translation studies have 
taken the discipline from operating at close quarters with linguistics 
into testing itself against the grain of historic, cultural, sociological, 
and cognitive considerations. This pendulum-like movement has 
been characterized by Umberto Eco as a debate between the 
skeptical-holistic argument and the postulate of a perfect language 
(Eco, 2001, 220-221). The first pole focuses on the impossibilities of 
translation and is typically instantiated as a belligerent revisionism 
about long-accepted “commonsensical” assertions about 
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translation. Almost as militantly, the second argument rejoices in 
descriptively mapping or prescriptively educating about all the 
possibilities that translation entails. 
The secular assumption that “translation is about meaning”—
and its epistemological nemesis, in which “translation is a matter 
that undermines the notion of meaning,” may be a convenient 
starting point in the search for areas of convergence between both 
disciplines. The link between meaning and rhetoric has been 
described by the American literary theorist Kenneth Burke as 
follows: “Wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And 
wherever there is ‘meaning’ there is persuasion” (Burke, 1969, 172). 
Under this understanding, the dealings of translation with meaning 
cannot ignore the deep impingements that both translation and 
meaning have on rhetoric. 
There is, however, a need to be selective in picking and choosing 
useful theoretical frameworks and methodologies from different 
disciplines (and not necessarily compatible ones in every case) that 
one deems to be productive in one’s own field. An inclusive and 
overarching definition of rhetoric—of contemporary rhetoric, that 
is—would draw concurring viewpoints from authors such as 
Burke—meaning is always persuaded (Burke, 1969)—or Friedrich 
Nietzsche—language is always allegorical (Nietzsche, 1989, 23-25, 
67). From a more modern approach, such as the multidisciplinary 
one provided by semiotics, other authors have posited that rhetoric 
functions as a repository of commonly accepted “truths” and that 
rhetoric is pleasurable to the persuaded (Eco, 1999, 167-173; 
Barthes, 1985, 132). From the field of linguistics or the related 
subfields of pragmatics, philosophy of language, and comparative 
rhetoric, language has been considered a form of energy (or 
“perlocutionary force”) addressed to the goal of physically and/or 
psychologically modifying the environment of the speaker (Austin, 
1975; Nietzsche, 1989; Quine, 1960; Kennedy, 1998; Burke, 1965). 
Such a selection of notions will lend itself to a more comfortable 
alignment with one or more diametrically opposed paradigms in 
translation studies. Consequently, the discipline has tended to 
recruit a myriad of theoretical bodies to sustain its frequently 
opposing causes and goals. 
More culturally preoccupied, Eco also views rhetoric as a sort of 
repository of “acquired formulas,” not just under the appearance of 
rhetorical devices—which would be “linguistic techniques”—but 
also a symbolic repository that sinks its roots into commonplaces 
accepted by a community of speakers (Eco, 1999, 173). This 
approach takes us back to Roland Barthes’s Mythologies, in which 
the author views rhetoric as linked to ideological domination and to 
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the imposition of constructs that pass themselves off as “natural” 
and inevitable, or at least as “probable premises” (Barthes, 1970). 
Consistent with a view that equates the symbolic with the 
linguistic and thus the rhetorical, Burke states,  
[…] rhetoric as such is not rooted in any past condition 
of human society. It is rooted in an essential function of 
language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is 
continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic 
means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature 
respond to symbols (Burke, 1969, 43). 
Burke’s observation suggests again that, at one extreme, meaning is 
always persuaded. That is, it corresponds to an enlistment of the 
persuader’s reasoning and the traditionally stable and obvious 
referential value conferred on “Meaning”—with a capital “M”—and 
therefore always depends on a purely dialectical question; it is 
“meaning” for me precisely to the extent that it is meaning for 
someone else. Meaning is not just established necessarily through 
otherness, but is also defined in its nature as a struggle with the 
other—and again, not just necessarily a cooperative struggle, as is 
frequently purveyed by pragmatics. 
Nietzsche refuted the autonomous nature of rhetoric, claiming 
that its apparatus is merely a refinement that takes the basic 
mechanisms of language themselves perpetually to the extreme, 
departing in an endless motion from original referentiality—a long-
lost referentiality and, actually, a never truly existent one beyond 
sheer contextual deixis:  
The tropes, the nonliteral significations, are considered 
the most artistic means of rhetoric. But, with respect to 
their meanings, all words are tropes in themselves, and 
from their very beginning. Instead of what truly takes 
place, they represent a sound image, which fades away in 
time (Nietzsche, 1989, 23).  
For Nietzsche there is scant difference, if any, between words 
proper and tropes, inasmuch as there is not much of a difference 
between regular speech and the so-called rhetorical figures 
(Nietzsche, 1989, 25). 
For Nietzsche, and subsequently others, the formation of a 
rhetorical expression is a question of power; as a violation of the 
linguistic norm, it can be rejected as an error—and the speaker thus 
perceived as incompetent—or can be welcomed as an innovation 
and embraced, thereby becoming a new species of “rhetorical 
device” that ultimately emerges from the authority that proposes it. 
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The resonances of this stance with pragmatics and the notion of 
“perlocutionary force” are hardly escapable. Also, the notion of 
“violation of the norm” brings us closer to generally accepted 
principles in more classical rhetorical terms (deviation or 
markedness) that have left a significant footprint in translation 
studies in the form of another classical binary confrontation in 
translation theory: that of domesticating and foreignizing 
translation. 
How does translation transact with the fundamentally rhetorical 
nature of text? If rhetoric binds to meaning and thus becomes a 
meaning-making (i.e., cognitive) operation, what would be the 
potential contribution of cognition-centered approaches the effects 
that are activated by rhetorical devices in texts of various sorts? 
How do such devices travel (or not travel) across languages and 
worldviews when texts undergo translation? The traditional 
dialectics of “lost and found in translation,” which are typically 
focused at either a semantic or a referential level, is likely to be 
insufficient to describe these complex processes in depth. Rhetoric 
matters. 
 
The Rhetoric of Meaning in Translation Studies 
The discussion will turn here to reviewing how the history of 
translation theory, and more recently, of translation studies as a 
systematized field of inquiry, has been permeated by specific 
conceptual paradigms and discourses, each with a rhetoric of their 
own, that may paradoxically have evaded the importance of rhetoric 
itself in the definition of their object of study. In that sense, the 
conundrums listed in the previous section roughly outline the 
struggle that translation studies confronts in establishing a 
relationship vis-à-vis meaning, inasmuch as the long-standing 
“token of truth” (translation as a successful or unsuccessful 
transaction of meaning) frequently goes against the grain of 
uncertainties about “the meaning of meaning.” The relativistic, 
non-essentialist approach to meaning that contemporary rhetoric 
also purveys has proved very fertile within a number of post-
structuralist approaches to literary studies and translation studies. 
However, this approach has frequently failed to move beyond the 
stumbling block of a sterile debate about the possibility or 
impossibility of translation (Dávila-Montes, 2012, 51). In moving 
toward a complete incorporation of language into the realm of 
rhetoric, a profound questioning of language’s strictly referential 
function emerges, and therefore a rift gradually appears within the 
notion of a “clean” referential value of meaning that is detached 
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from interpersonal (intercultural and interlinguistic, in the case of 
translation) power relations. Inevitably, a connection between 
meaning and persuasion is again drawn, which would bring us to 
the dialectical approach of Hegel—specifically to the master-slave 
discourse—applied to the areas of study commonly known as 
“translation and power” and “post-colonial translation studies.” 
Let us first take a few steps back and survey what 
correspondences or lack of it exist between the summary of 
concepts listed above and the several attempts (rather indirect 
ones, as we will see) that translation scholars have put forward in 
order to benefit from the intellectual edifice of rhetoric in its 
broadest possible definition. There is a whole, yet rather selective, 
“rhetoric of meaning” in translation studies. 
Contemporary translation studies began to consolidate as a 
theoretical body in the 1950s, with efforts to tackle, sometimes 
piecemeal, the singularities of translation: a communicational 
activity with a history of several millennia that had, nevertheless, a 
meager academic tradition outside the boundaries of what was 
known as “grammar-translation” (or the use of translation as a 
primitive language-acquisition tool). In an interconnected world, 
with an increasing presence of translation as a respected 
intellectual activity, and in the midst of the exultant parade of 
scientific positivism of the mid-twentieth century, translation 
scholars resorted to linguistics and to “microscope-like” approaches 
to the object of their study in a way that may be comparable to what 
has been described as “little rhetoric.” The misleadingly named 
“stylistique comparée” inaugurated a tradition of language-pair 
scrutiny of morphological, lexical, and syntactical correspondences 
in an attempt to draw a meticulous map of the infinite spider’s web 
of relationships spanning out from the minute comparison of 
grammars and languages (Vinay and Darbelnet, 1958). Still 
influenced by the heavy “grammar-translation” tradition, efforts 
frequently came, almost inevitably, to anticlimactic screeching halts 
when approaching the boundaries of the sentence, or the 
paragraph, at the very most. 
Still within “conventional” linguistics, but with a strong 
generativist import, authors such as John Catford laid out in the 
1960s and 70s the groundwork for mathematical, formula-like 
abstractions that apparently elevated the previous head-to-head 
comparisons to the stature of a—at least potentially—computerized 
process (Catford, 2000 [1965]). From that point on, the influence of 
computer-oriented thought in the development of translation 
theories has periodically permeated advances in the practical 
application of translation technologies, and also in the 
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incorporation of statistical analysis in translation-oriented 
research. To that era of definitional struggles belongs the 
manifesto-like 1988 paper “The Name and Nature of Translation 
Studies,” which notoriously claimed full-fledged status for the 
discipline within the empirical sciences (Holmes, 2000). 
Specific cultural preoccupations and advances in 
communication studies had by then already overcome limitations 
in the search for formal correspondence and had fueled 
semantically based theories of dynamic equivalence, such as those 
stemming from the works of Eugene Nida, or revolving around text 
type and textual functions, e.g., Hans Vermeer’s skopos theory 
(Nida, 1964; Schäffner, 2001). Pragmatics in general, and most 
significantly, the notion of meaning as a social construct, such as in 
Paul Grice’s theory of meaning or Dan Sperber and Deirdre 
Wilson’s relevance theory, provided a foothold for a number of 
theoretical “raids” from translation studies that brought home a 
bounty of new directions in research, systemically washing out the 
interest of previously accepted constructs that had enjoyed a 
relatively prestigious status (Grice, 1957; Serber and Wilson, 1990). 
From a purely textual approach, textual linguistics and 
discourse analysis opened the door to a wave of yet wider text- and 
ideology-based approaches in the 1990s, such as that of Basil Hatim 
and Ian Mason (Hatim and Mason, 1990). Strong, pedagogically 
and process-oriented research endeavors began to benefit from the 
widespread use of computers by translators and from the ability to 
register keystroke logs, record every operation conducted on the 
screen, and even eye-track the gaze of the translating human, 
guinea pig-like, subjects. Also, through corpus linguistics, the 
statistical comparison of translations, their source texts, and non-
translated original texts has generated the ability to compile 
massive occurrences at the micro level and to extrapolate them to 
wider horizons. The rhetoric of translation studies adopted 
discourses of broader scope, including some with universalist 
claims and others with political and historical concerns. And yet, 
many of the achievements of these empirically oriented 
methodologies could not circumvent the epistemological 
shortcoming of accepting the nature of meaning (whichever nature 
of meaning) as a given, as a guaranteed starting point for every 
construct to grow from. A robust rhetoric of empiricism in 
translation studies seemed to have validated James Holmes’s claim 
that, “Translation studies is, as no one I suppose would deny, an 
empirical discipline” (Holmes, 2000, section 3.1). 
From the opposite direction, in a way that might perhaps be 
labeled “deductive” rather than “inductive,” Nietzsche’s equation of 
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language and rhetoric and Jacques Derrida’s incursions into 
translation from the fields of philosophy and literary criticism 
fostered a school of thought in translation studies with strong ties 
to deconstruction and social criticism (Derrida, 1985). The study of 
power relations in translation and the history of translation as a 
necessary participant in power dynamics provided fertile ground 
for overarching discussions, somewhat close to the quarters of “big 
rhetoric.” With a strong influence from Marxist and 
psychoanalytical theories, objectivity of meaning is presented as 
illusory and always subject to a set of social, interpersonal, 
intercultural, political, and hegemonic factors. Thinkers such as 
Walter Benjamin, Pierre Bourdieu, or Michel Foucault are invoked, 
and discussion extends the epistemological preoccupations of 
translation studies to areas that had traditionally belonged to 
metaphysics, literary criticism, or sociological theory. With the 
eminently symbolic value of language now a given, the definition of 
translation is approached as a study of its metaphorics (St. André, 
2010). Translation is considered a tool for unveiling the unstable 
nature of meaning, as well as a “living proof” of epistemic 
relativism, thus incorporating social and gender agendas, political 
discourse, and literary activism. Significantly rooted in these 
premises, a “cultural turn” in translation studies took place, 
followed by a “sociological turn” in which meaning ceases to be the 
unquestioned currency of every translational activity and in which 
translation and its paradoxes become a battering ram against 
conventional wisdom. 
In a more cognitivist and constructivist vein, but drawing on 
post-structuralist semiotics, translation is also seen as an 
interlinguistic meaning-making process with a focus on interpretive 
and authorial agency rather than on semantic transfer. Every 
meaning-making operation is seen as the notional byproduct of a 
perpetual process of symbolic action known as “semiosis,” by virtue 
of which the endless substitution of a sign by another sign is 
everything per se that meaning is: a dynamis of permanent 
replacement of signs. Viewed in this light, translation is typically 
heavily taxed on account of the expectation that it is a substitution 
that does not substitute but equates (Dávila-Montes, 2012, 48-51). 
In this approach translation can also be considered one of the 
foremost examples of semiosis. A target text is a sign that replaces a 
source text and signifies it, and therefore ascribes itself to the ranks 
of meaning-making operations par excellence. In this light, then, 
meaning ceases to be “the object” of translation, and translation 
becomes the very essence of meaning. 
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Comparative Rhetoric and Translation Studies: A 
Detour of Meaning by Way of the Enthymeme’s 
“Short-cut” 
This section will examine areas of disciplinary concurrence in the 
fields of translation studies and rhetoric, most specifically, in the 
area of comparative rhetoric as a robust intersection between the 
two. While translation traditionally needs to “mind” a wide array of 
factors in order successfully to meet communicative expectations, 
the study of disparate rhetorical practices in different cultures 
and/or languages has not necessarily taken a center stage position 
in translation studies, at least not in a clear, explicit way. This 
section will therefore explore how the notion of “meaning-making” 
as an object/goal of both communicative acts (translation and 
rhetoric) can provide a solid ground for reciprocal disciplinary 
growth. I will look into relatively recent meaning-oriented cognitive 
approaches to rhetoric that consider it from a neurolinguistics 
perspective. I will reflect on a specific rhetorical device, the 
enthymeme: a pervasive mechanism in a myriad of languages and 
rhetorical traditions, as an illustration of a potential comparative 
basis for a systematic study of the translation of rhetoric. 
Recent approaches to rhetoric have drawn from cognitive 
science and cognitive linguistics, establishing—with strong and 
frequently ignored psychoanalytical echoes—that the intrinsically 
rhetorical nature of language mirrors the fundamental structure of 
human cognition (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). Neurolinguistics has 
described “meaning” as dynamic neural connections between 
different areas in the sensorimotor regions of the brain and the 
regions in which subjective experience resides. In a manner that 
recalls the same approach, contemporary psychoanalysis proposes 
meaning as the unstable intersection between the imaginary and 
symbolic orders of the human psyche (Librecht, 2001, 198). These 
are, roughly in semiotic terms, the iconic and the symbolic, which 
in turn can be seen as the activity happening in different regions of 
the brain. In many instances, these approaches describe the 
mechanisms of cognition as primarily metonymic—metonymy 
understood as the trope of contiguity and displacement—or 
metaphoric. Whereas metonymic connections relate notions in the 
same domain or “cognitive space,” metaphoric connections (true 
“new meaning”) relate notions “located” in different domains or 
“cognitive spaces.” The connections between cognition/meaning 
and language/rhetoric surface in a way that seems not just 
narrative or pictorial—as in we need to use metaphors to talk about 
language and cognition—but structural, telling us what language 
and cognition are, as in tropes are the manifestation—in the 
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‘material’ linguistic surface—of the very mechanisms of deeper 
neural, and thus also material, activity. 
There is a moderate claim to universalism in George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson, but in spite of their cautious hedging, the simple 
fact that their proposals were initially posed within and stemmed 
from research developed in a monolingual scientific paradigm (that 
is, English-speaking academia) speaks volumes about the 
epistemological limitations that these proposals are binding 
themselves to, precisely when they are lucubrating about language 
(and not just “one” language) and human cognition (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1999, 284). It also speaks volumes about how much 
translation studies may contribute to expanding and commenting 
on the assertions that come out of these and similar theoretical 
bodies regarding language and rhetoric. Nothing in the alleged 
universalism of the above-mentioned theories or the notion of an 
“embodied mind” contradicts the foreseeable possibility that 
different cultures have developed different rhetorical/cognitive 
refinements, or at least have privileged some mechanisms, whether 
universal or not, above others (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).  
Translation has frequently been seen as a text about a text. 
Within the functionalist school, for example, translations have been 
seen as “[I]nformation… about information originally offered in 
another language” (Schäffner, 1998, 236). Such information is 
conveyed overtly or covertly (House, 1981). So, when we talk about 
translations of advertising, for example, we consider persuasion to 
be the desired effect of a metatext—a text about a text—to the extent 
that it produces in the target audience “similar effects” to those of 
the source text, most desirably in a “covert” fashion (i.e. not 
revealing the fact that the target text is actually a translation). 
These effects (or rhetorical value) are achieved by methods known 
to be substantially different in disparate advertising environments 
and linguistic traditions. It has been discussed by several studies 
and language pairs for the translation of advertising: transporting 
every single rhetorical or linguistic device from source to target, 
even if it were to be syntactically possible, would likely be highly 
unsuccessful in achieving such persuasive effects (Al-Shehari, 
2004; Bueno García, 2000; Dávila-Montes, 2008; Guidère, 2000, 
2001, 2003; Shakir 1995; Torresi, 2010; Valdés Rodríguez, 2004). 
In more general terms, conventional wisdom in translation 
practices has long established that perfectly valid and viable 
microstructures in both the source and target languages can be 
carried over from one to the other every time they appear in a text 
and still produce highly unnatural renditions from the wider 
perspective of a macro-textual approach. 
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The question, then, is: Does a given tolerated violation of the 
norm as a rhetorical principle work the same way in different 
languages and cultures? The answer, well-known in both 
translation studies and comparative rhetoric, is “no.” The supposed 
basic rhetorical principle that equates rhetoric instantiations to 
tolerated violations of a norm might vary considerably in the degree 
(or direction) of transgression within different linguistic traditions. 
Moreover, it may vary in the level of tolerance for violations or 
types of violations, or even in the very “normality” (or frequency) of 
the norm.  
As described in the previous section, the Western tradition in 
translation theory has provided ample focus on contrastive 
approaches by establishing systematic comparisons between 
languages at the grammatical levels (lexical, morphological, and 
syntactic) and has made inroads in comparative discourse analysis 
and even in incorporating non-traditional grammars into its 
methodologies, such as Michael Halliday’s systemic functional 
grammar. Thus, multiple efforts have been dedicated to language-
pair-based studies (Pym, 2016). However, these studies are all too 
often restricted in their range, or at least significantly restricted in 
their scope, sometimes because of the very nature of their 
grammatical meta-language, which is usually based on Western-
language grammars (Niranjana, 1992, 34-35), and hence on the 
Latin tradition from which they stem (Dons, 1971). At the macro 
level, discourse analysis has frequently stumbled on the specificity 
of case-based studies, or on the implied ethnocentricity of Robert 
Kaplan’s “cultural thought patterns” (Kaplan, 1966). Muriel Saville-
Troike cautions against falling into a biased “ethnocentric labeling” 
when attempting to comparatively describe syntax, discourse, and 
rhetorical devices as cultural artifacts (Saville-Troike, 2002, 151-
153). Nonetheless, comparative rhetoric, viewed as the comparison 
of rhetorical strategies in different languages, is now a several-
decades-old discipline. Contrastive studies, bound as they are by 
the very nature of the object they endeavor to study (language) and 
by the main tool used to achieve such an endeavor (also language), 
typically find their most productive expressions inductively, 
working upward from case studies and resorting to the one 
legitimate tool within its epistemological limits: proof by contrast. 
While such contrapositions may have merit and import when 
contrasting relatively close languages (since degrees of possible 
correspondence can be frequently found at many grammatical and 
sometimes morphological levels), a contrastive comparison of 
languages belonging to more distant phyla becomes increasingly 
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difficult, if not at times utterly pointless (Dávila-Montes, 2008, 
491-493). 
The alleged universalism of some of the rhetorical stances 
described in the previous pages may suggest that a comparison of 
rhetorical strategies and their frequencies can provide a more even-
handed basis for contrastive or comparative studies of languages, 
and hence for the study of translations between specific language 
pairs. Within the field of comparative rhetoric, George A. Kennedy 
presents an interesting study of a number of aspects of oratory and 
rhetoric in ancient China—and in other eras and civilizations—in 
comparison with the Classical Greek tradition. He found that 
although persuasive Chinese political discourse has a macro-textual 
structure similar to the Western one—introduction, narrative, 
argument, and conclusion—it is, nonetheless, based on different 
values (Kennedy, 1998, 141-166). Classical Chinese rhetoric avoids 
emotive exhortation (pathos) and relies on the authority of the 
orator as an argument in itself (ethos). According to Kennedy, 
discursive brilliance in the Chinese tradition submits to the 
supremacy of honesty and sincerity; logical argumentation is 
mostly inductive in nature, while deductive argumentation is 
relegated to a secondary position and is mainly enthymemic in form 
(Kennedy, 1998, 151). The “secondary role” that Kennedy identifies 
in enthymemes within the Chinese rhetorical tradition poses a 
substantial contradiction to the central function of enthymemes in 
Western rhetoric, which I will discuss in the following paragraphs. 
Let us scrutinize enthymemes as rhetorical devices identified in 
a wide range of very disparate languages in an attempt to unveil the 
reason for their potentially across-the-board validity as a cognitive 
operation. Barthes, following Aristotle, established that enthy-
memes are a rhetorical device eminently based on identification 
and articulated according to a principle of verisimilitude or 
plausibility of premises; an enthymeme is defined as being an 
incomplete syllogism (Barthes, 1985, 130-1). The enthymeme is said 
to be “a more economical discourse that appeals to the intelligence 
of the recipient” and implicitly invites him or her to fill in meaning 
(Beristáin, 2006, 173, my translation).  
The classic example of the enthymeme is reduced to the famous 
expression, “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Socrates is 
mortal.” Yet an “incomplete” expression of this syllogism implies 
participation on the part of the receiver: “All men are mortal so 
Socrates is mortal.” That Socrates is a man is understood. 
Enthymemes, by omitting one of the premises of the syllogism, 
appeal to what already exists—that is, to identification. However, in 
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regard to their theme/rheme structure, enthymemes propose a 
topic that is accepted by consensus: “All men are mortal.” 
The enthymeme’s destination (new information) is the 
conclusion—“Socrates is mortal”—but it may or may not imply 
information that is truly new for the recipient. Whether it does or 
not is not necessarily relevant to the persuasive process since, new 
or old, the information must be turned into “persuaded” meaning; 
strictly speaking, it is a matter not of contributing new information, 
but of convincing the audience of the soundness of that 
information, regardless of whether it is new or old. What, then, has 
taken place between premise and conclusion? Apparently nothing, 
as the second term of the syllogism is omitted. Yet it is precisely this 
omission that is the key to the enthymeme’s persuasive process. It 
identifies “A” (mortality) with “C” (Socrates) by virtue of “B” 
(Socrates is a man) but without going through “B”—omitting that 
step. So what happens with “B”? It is left in the hands of the 
listener. In pragmatic terms, this is a sort of “implicature,” but 
semiotically speaking, the listener is charged with the responsibility 
of “reconstructing” the syllogism, and he or she is invited to 
establish a relationship—or, as Lakoff and Johnson express it, to 
establish a [metaphorical] connection—between two elements from 
different areas (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). 
The connection created is not a real connection but a 
simulacrum of one. If we said, “All cats are mortal, and therefore 
Socrates is mortal,” the implicature would be that Socrates is a 
feline. In that case, an authentic connection between two initially 
separate pieces of information would be produced: “The speaker 
owns or knows of a cat that happens to share its name with the 
Greek philosopher.” Although the premise omitted in the original 
enthymeme (“Socrates is a man”) already exists as this second 
premise (“B”), it is omitted precisely because it is taken as a 
“probable premise” or “consensus truth.” Thus, the enthymeme 
triggers the mechanism of the metaphorical connection between 
two regions that are, in fact, already connected from the beginning: 
“man” and “Socrates.” It becomes a sort of false activation of the 
cognitive mechanism; the mechanism is in fact produced—the 
listener must make the connection for the syllogism to work—and 
yet it is produced with elements that are already connected 
beforehand—that is, with elements that are already identified with 
each other. Cognitively speaking, we could say that enthymemes 
attempt to demonstrate movement by revving up the engine of a car 
that has no wheels and has already arrived at its destination. The 
enthymeme’s persuasive efficacy comes from its ability to 
incorporate in a single rhetorical device both metaphorical and 
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metonymic functions—that is, the symbolic and the iconic 
intersecting: meaning. This does not mean that an enthymeme 
should be articulated based on what is called, strictu sensu, 
“metaphor” or “metonymy”; there is very little metaphor in “All 
men are mortal.” Quite the contrary, we are speaking of 
metaphorical and metonymic “cognitive functions.” It is from the 
intersection of those functions that meaning is produced. The trick 
is that “meaning” was already there; enthymemes just pull the 
rabbit out of an “empty hat full of rabbits.” Moreover, this trick is 
re-enacted in a multiplicity of languages, as we will see next. 
As opposed to the lack of fit in the array and assembly of 
rhetorical devices within discourse that Kennedy purports reveal at 
the macro level, at the micro level the apparently universal fit of 
some structures would, perhaps, help to pinpoint common 
correspondences between languages that are typically translated 
without much of a thought: that is, with an effortless assumption of 
neat, equivalent correspondence in their rhetorical efficacy 
(Kennedy, 1998). A more specific example is the Latin construction 
“non solum […] sed etiam […]” (not only A but also B). The 
structure is similar to that of the enthymeme, except that the 
second premise is made explicit through a double negative (“not” 
and “only”) that first cancels and then activates it. “Only” has 
negational value because “only A” implies “not C, nor D … nor X, 
nor Y, nor Z,” only “A.” 
Through the construction “non solum A sed etiam B,” “B” is 
communicated, but the objective is in fact to reinforce the validity 
of A. Thus, in saying that a car is “not only fast but also fuel 
efficient,” the efficiency argument, whether true or not, has an 
initial informational value, but it is the speed argument that is 
inherently persuasive because it instills in the receiver a meta-
implicature: “the speed of this vehicle is a given.” It is a “meta-
implicature” because what is omitted is not necessarily objective 
information (the speediness of the car, which is explicitly stated) 
but information on how to interpret that information (“this 
vehicle’s speed is a given, and you ought to accept it, too. I am 
talking from authority and thus you are accepting not just the 
information about the speed, but my authority”). 
The double negative presents the information in such a way that 
an immediate identification must be established: “Not only is it 
fast” implies “I know that you already know it is fast.” The listener 
may not already be aware of this particular vehicle’s velocity-related 
virtues, but in presenting the information in this way, persuaders 
create a dynamic of “it is a fact known to all; you had better believe 
it, too. Socrates is a man, and this car is fast.” The expression is 
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found in a wide range of languages within a varied number of 
families, including Romance (Italian: non solo ma anche; Spanish: 
no sólo sino también; Catalan: no només sinó també; French: non 
seulement mais encore); Anglogermanic (English: not only … but 
also…; German: nicht nur sondern auch), and also Semitic (Arabic: 
), Indo-Iranian (Persian: ), Kurdish (
), Altaic (Turkish: na bas lakin ham), Ural-Altaic 
(Japanese: だけじゃなくて – … dake ja nakute), or Sino-Tibetan 
(Chinese: 不仅 … 而且… – bujin … erquie, or already in the Classical 
period before the introduction of Western-inspired forms: 不唯 ... 
而 – bù wéi ... ér; or 不獨 ... 而 – bù dú ... ér).1 
In addition, the etymological distance between the words in the 
phrase, even among closely related languages such as the Romance 
family, seems to reinforce the idea that these linguistic 
constructions are not a matter of a simple linguistic idiom. If it 
were so, there would be more similarity in the etymology of the 
logical positions they occupy. On the contrary, and very much as 
with enthymemes, it seems that this expression is a sort of 
persuasive cognitive “automatism” triggered by the invocation of 
the previously mentioned principles. Even in the unlikely case that 
this structure has been systematically transferred between such a 
range of cultures and languages through influences or translations, 
the fact that an expression with such a relatively complex logical 
structure (negation + element of exclusivity + adversative particle + 
emphatic affirmation) is commonly used in so many languages as a 
persuasive device is clearly relevant because of its demonstrated 
enticement power and because of the fact that it can point toward 
fundamental cognitive structures. 
The question that arises from these premises (existence of 
enthymemes in a given language pair and different values of 
enthymemes in the two rhetorical traditions) seems inevitable: 
They can obviously be translated. But when must they be? 
 
Translated Rhetoric: From Particular Differences 
to Far-Flung Limits 
The discussion in this section will turn to outlining plausible 
approaches to the translation of rhetorical devices within texts 
                                                    
1 I thank Drs. Alexander Dawoody (for Turkish, Arabic, Kurdish, and 
Farsi), Sara Rovira (Chinese), and Anne Helene Suárez (Chinese) for this 
information. 
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belonging to two different rhetorical traditions, paying close 
attention to how the structural (grammatical) differences between 
languages curtail a viable transaction of all possible rhetorical 
devices in a text. I will also consider briefly the effect of the 
opposite circumstance: when all rhetorical devices in a segment can 
(grammatically) be translated into the target text. I contend that a 
mapping of rhetorical-cultural values may be the primary 
requirement in attempting to answer the question of when a 
rhetorical device that exists in both languages (target and source) 
can be reasonably translated or, perhaps, when it rather should not 
be. 
Cultural studies has proposed a wide classification of cultures 
based on their enlistment on a Low Context Communication (LCC) 
and High Context Communication (HCC) scale. David Katan 
discusses Edward Hall’s theories on the different relationships with 
context found across cultures (Hall, 1983; Katan, 2004, 245-260). 
In LCC, the communication process tends to take place with a 
greater degree of contextual independence, whereas HCC more 
fully incorporates contextual matters into discourse and behavior. 
In ranking cultures typifying these parameters (which Katan cites 
from other authors, claiming that they do not correspond to any 
other statistic he knows of [Katan, 2004, 253]) Swiss-German 
culture would be positioned as the ultimate example of LCC, fitting 
well “the stereotype of exacting precision and detailed information” 
(Katan, 2004, 253), closely followed by German and Scandinavian 
cultures. At the other extreme (HCC) is Japanese culture—
supposedly satisfying “our stereotype of their inscrutable culture” 
(Katan, 2004, 253)—followed by Arabic and Latin American 
cultures. Setting aside for the moment the element of cultural 
stereotyping inherent in this approach, and also overcoming a 
reasonable resistance to extreme dichotomies, we find it interesting 
that such a distinction, if accurate, is necessarily instantiated by the 
nature of the rhetorical strategies used in each culture.  
We need to keep in mind Muriel Saville-Troike’s caution against 
ethnocentric labeling, but Katan summarizes the contributions of 
various authors and establishes an interesting set of concepts based 
on the classification system described earlier (Katan, 2004). 
According to this classification, an operative mode of low 
contextualization places emphasis on text, facts, direct modes, 
coherence, substance, rules, and monochromy. High 
contextualization emphasizes context, relationships/feelings, 
indirect modes, flexibility in meaning, social and personal 
appearance, circumstances, and polychromy (Katan, 2004, 220). 
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Katan moves on to paraphrase Hall and other authors from the 
field of neuroscience who propose a relationship between two 
“cultural tendencies,” the lateralization of brain function, and task 
specialization in the two hemispheres (left: verbal, logical, 
sequential, symbolic, temporal, linear, and detail-based skills; 
right: nonverbal, spatial, musical, creative, holistic, emotional, 
imaginative, pattern-based, and visualization skills) (Katan, 2004, 
257). This model is too simplistic and cannot solely account for the 
complexity of the processes that constitute culture and their 
rhetorical instantiation at every moment and in every environment. 
However, a conception of rhetoric understood not only as 
“persuasive discourse,” but also as materials instantiating deep 
cognitive mechanisms that connect different regions and functions 
of the brain, might provide plausible explanations in this model. 
These would account for differences found among languages and 
cultures, not only in the Weltanschauung, or worldviews, but also 
in signaling the substantially different rhetorical strategies favored 
by each cultural tradition. 
Empirical studies through magnetic resonance imaging that 
compare brain activity in bilingual individuals in English and 
Spanish seem to sustain the claim that “neural language processing 
differs across their two languages” and that  
[…] both monolinguals (in one language) and bilinguals 
(in each language) showed predicted increases in 
activation in classic language areas […], with any neural 
differences between the bilingual’s two languages being 
principled and predictable based on the 
morphosyntactic differences between Spanish and 
English […] suggesting that there may be a functional 
separation of a bilingual’s two languages in one brain 
based on the formal linguistic properties of each given 
languages (Kovelman, Baker and Petitto, 2008, 
emphasis mine). 
If we view rhetorical devices as complex mechanisms stemming 
from morphosyntax, it is conceivable that rhetorical differences 
between languages have some sort of reciprocation with the 
different cognitive or neural “mappings” that different cultures 
feature or define. 
In the previous sections I have attempted to lay out a 
background from which several questions seem naturally to spring: 
What happens with the rhetorical value of a text when this text is 
translated? What happens with a text at the macro level once 
micro-level structures have been accurately transported from the 
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target to the source? What happens with the rhetorical value of the 
target text when a mix of successful and unsuccessful micro-level 
transports takes place, as is known to occur in nearly every single 
piece of translation exceeding the length of a few words? Can, 
perhaps, the old dialectics of “lost and found in translation” be 
mapped more efficiently from an economy of rhetoric rather than 
from the elusive, highly unaccountable economics of meaning?  
The last question entails a significant shift from the traditional 
and contemporary paradigms in translation studies, by which old 
debates on translatability and untranslatability could be 
approached from the scrutiny of the structural metonymic and 
metaphorical choices—lexicalized landscapes—that different 
languages lay out: not a mapping of morphological or syntactic 
disparities, whether lexical or semantic, on the micro level or a 
depiction of discursive discrepancies at the macro level, but rather a 
face-to-face confrontation of rhetorical gains, losses, and 
transformations. This shift may contribute to clarify the struggles of 
translation with the notion of meaning, given the premise that 
meaning and rhetoric go hand in hand in the construction of text. 
Perhaps an account of translation’s possibilities and impossibilities 
can be outlined from a systematic description of rhetorical 
correspondences or their lack thereof. Perhaps a snapshot of “all 
things lost in translation” can be taken too, frame by frame, with 
the high-speed camera of meticulous rhetorical analysis.  
Studies of metaphorical conceptualization in translating from 
English into Greek have hinted at the importance of “preferred 
schemata” in vertical or horizontal special relations in each 
language (and therefore cultural rhetorical traditions), which 
surface from the analysis of corpora of aligned translations (or 
“parallel corpora”) (Sidiropoulou and Hoidas, 2014). Corpus 
linguistics provides powerful tools for such analyses. Perhaps on 
account of the exacting and time-consuming process of tagging 
elements (often by hand) within a body of texts of sufficient and 
relevant size, however, these tools in translation studies have more 
frequently been applied to inquiries about lexical occurrence, co-
occurrence, or frequency analyses of grammatical features. 
From a less statistically based approach, Karol Hardin has 
proposed an exhaustive comparative study of pragmatic strategies 
within a large corpus of television advertising in Spanish, in 
regional varieties from Spain, Chile, and the United States. She 
employed the pragmatics of Grice, John Austin, and John Searle to 
compare more than 500 advertisements for each lectal variety 
(Hardin, 2001). Her pragmatic analyses are illustrative in their own 
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right, but a comparison of the rhetorical structure of some of the 
slogans she selects may provide further insight into the topic: 
1) Y McDonald’s donará dinero a Ronald 
McDonald House Charities (62). 
2) Nuevos precios bajos todos los días (62). 
3) Yo y mis psíquicos atenderán a tus problemas 
(62). 
4) Cada experiencia en el nuevo Camry te llevará 
a la grandeza de sus cambios (62). 
5) Cambia a AT&T y recibe dos entradas a un 
juego de MLX (61). 
6) Obtenga el respeto que usted se merece (89). 
7) Miller Time. Todo puede pasar (158). 
8) Llame a su compañía local de cable y ordene 
HBO en español ahora (37). 
(Hardin, 2001) 
Some of the preceding examples are clearly translations of 
identifiable English-language slogans: (2) New Low Prices 
Everyday (HEB supermarkets and Giant supermarkets); (7) At 
Miller Time anything can happen (Miller beer). Others seem to be 
translations because of the frequency with which they employ 
formulations characteristic of unskilled renditions, with 
grammatical structures, lexical units, and turns of phrase from 
English that remain apparent in the translated expression: (1) 
donará dinero (‘will donate money’: frequency and idiomaticity); 
(2) Nuevos precios bajos (‘new low prices’: excessive apposition of 
adjectives); (3) Yo y mis psíquicos atenderán (‘I and my psychics 
will assist’: subject order and subject-verb agreement); (4) cada 
experiencia en (‘each experience in’: prepositional pattern); (5) 
juego de MLX (‘game of MLX’: calque/false cognate); (6) respeto 
(‘respect’: denotative and connotative semantic disparity); (7) Todo 
puede pasar (‘anything can happen’: literalness, idiomaticity); and 
(8) ordene (‘order’: false cognate). 
It is evident that a significant number of these differences arise 
from a less than skillful translation of advertising copy or slogans 
originally in English. However, it may be more interesting to reflect 
on the fact that some of these and other examples written for the 
Spanish-speaking consumer in the US may be a transaction of a 
different nature: not a translation of an existing text, but a 
translation of “empty” (and thus “pure”) rhetorical structures; not a 
matter of specific, case-by-case calque or loan translations, but of 
responding to transplanted rhetorical expectations. In short, a true 
translation of a rhetorical “repository of acquired formulas.” These 
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would not be classified as pseudo-translations, as traditionally 
defined, because there is no attempt to pass them off as translations 
of a source text (Robinson, 2001); rather, they are translations of a 
“rhetorical source” that in many cases does not exist as a real text. 
This “rhetorical source” is nonetheless ubiquitous in advertising, as 
part of discursive strategies that impregnate the production of text 
in media that overflow into other languages. These are transplanted 
into the target language and are completed (“fill-in-the-blanks” 
like) with target-language-only words. It is not rhetorical text that is 
translated here, but rhetorical structures that respond in this case 
to a different tradition, as readymade truths in alien readymade 
structures.  
The implications of this possibility extend to the intercultural 
realm, which implies, in turn, that the range of rhetorical strategies 
in different languages needs to be systematically compared. The 
notion of a “rhetorical map” has been proposed in order to illustrate 
how translated advertising slogans undergo a profound 
transformation in their rhetorical structure when they are 
submitted to the rules of grammatical and textual acceptability 
(Dávila-Montes, 2008, 455): 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of Rhetorical Maps Between an Original 
Advertising Piece in English and Its Official Spanish Translation 
(Dávila-Montes, 2008, 455)2 
                                                    
2 My translation. Reebok U.S. website, www.reebok.com/us, accessed 
12/2004. 
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The two maps show a slightly different distribution of rhetorical 
“weight and densities.” A neatly engineered array of tropes and 
syntactical functions in the source text is forced through target 
language grammar to a more diluted, less robust distribution of 
devices in a sentence which has nearly the same length and 
informational value. It would be tempting simply to conclude that 
the source text displays a more complex rhetorical array that gets 
“lost in translation”: more rhetorical nodes (balloons) in the source 
than in the target text, higher density of rhetorical/syntactical 
functions in a smaller number of lexical units—“Brand” subsumes 
four operations, for example: subject, agent, theme, and 
metonymy—a higher density of tropes, a more 
polarized/symmetrical distribution of rhetorical “weight” (more 
balloons in the source towards the beginning and the end), etc. 
Conversely, the translated version shows a more interleaved and 
gradual distribution of nodes throughout the length of the sentence. 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of the “Naked” Rhetorical Maps Ensuing from 
the Analysis of Source and Target Texts 
These rhetorical maps may not be just an illustrative portrait of 
“what is lost in one translation” at the micro-rhetorical level—what 
tropes disappear, what different schemata are introduced in the 
target text—but hopefully may also illustrate how the meaning-
making detail of translation needs to be more closely scrutinized 
through the lens of rhetoric, as a process of “creation of meaning,” 
rather than as a quest for “acceptability in deviation.” Conversely, 
the analysis of what tropes stay and what tropes disappear in 
translation may also contribute to hinting at the cognitive value of 
particular rhetorical structures beyond their specific persuasive 
value in one particular language, thus relating to differing 
tolerances towards rhetoric intensity, concentration, and density. 
The approach, however, of comparing rhetorical maps is not 
unproblematic. As mentioned before, comparisons risk 
systematically failing in several instances of “centrism,” either 
cultural or determined by the Linguistics (with capital “L”) tradition 
from which the analysis is being conducted. 
 José M. Dávila-Montes 23 Poroi 13,1 (May 2017) 
A useful notion may be that of “compared deviations.” While 
some categories may be intrinsically non-comparable in a number 
of language pairs due to profound morpho-syntactical lack of fit, 
the ability to statistically measure deviations or markedness from 
“general” texts in genre-limited corpora within a single language 
has been proposed as a methodology to study differences between 
advertising texts (Dávila-Montes, 2013). The notion of “deviation” 
is not epistemologically unproblematic either (Cook, 2001, 142-
147), but genre-restricted deviations can be measured in specific 
categories, whether syntactical or rhetorical, within different 
languages. In turn, these measurements can be compared when a 
degree of sufficient structural correspondence allows it (for 
example, in the use of enthymemes). Thus, it is not rhetorical 
devices that are being compared, but the tendency to deviate 
rhetorically that one textual genre presents in two different 
languages. Studies have demonstrated that advertising in Spanish, 
for example, may tend to resort to metonymy and enthymemes, 
that is, they tend to deviate from “neutral language,” three times 
more frequently than in English, or that, in general, advertising 
copy in English tends to be less inclined to rhetorical deviation than 
in Spanish (Dávila-Montes, 2013, 82). By superimposing findings of 
this nature on the above-mentioned “rhetorical maps,” conclusions 
may be reached on what is really lost rhetorically—not as a deficit in 
the transaction (how many “fewer devices” were viably 
transported), but as a finalistic, bottom-line deficit: that is, the net 
decrease in the ability to conform to the expectations and 
“readymade” macro-textual features within specific rhetorical 
tradition in the target-language culture. 
 
Conclusion: Reciprocally Ignorant Yet Mutually 
Dependent Neighbors 
In this paper I have attempted to outline the rich complexity of 
possible convergences between rhetoric, comparative rhetoric, and 
translation studies for their own areas of intellectual inquiry. By 
summarizing a limited number of theories and notions, I have 
drawn up approaches through which these disciplines can cross-
fertilize one another and thus increase the depth and scope of many 
of their premises: in translation studies by systematically 
incorporating powerful terms, notions, and methodologies from 
rhetoric; in rhetorical studies by including a share of inter-linguistic 
relativism in its questioning of discourse and import beyond the 
boundaries of a monolingual tradition. 
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On a rather shallow level, it can be said that the disciplines will 
indisputably benefit from a shared effort in defining themselves 
within academia as “not being just a matter of words.” They would 
also benefit from the claim of having a truly epistemic nature, as 
has been consistently argued for rhetoric, as well as for translation 
and cross-cultural studies (Ingraham, 2015; Gutiérrez, 2012). More 
deeply, it seems that any growth of either discipline in some specific 
direction may be significantly hindered by a secular lack of 
convergence between them. Every discussion of a generalizing 
nature in rhetorical studies is susceptible to deep questioning if its 
values are not checked against the relativizing premises of 
interlinguistic cognitivism. Conversely, most speculations in the 
linguistic and discursive comparison of languages and cultures 
within translation and cross-cultural studies is bound to become 
entangled in, and limited by, ethnocentric scientific taxonomies, 
inasmuch as the field is not furnished with a solid rhetorical 
metalanguage that allows for non-culturally biased rhetorical 
conceptualizations. 
Copyright © 2017 José M. Dávila-Montes 
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